股权激励对公司价值的影响因素研究——基于A股市场2008—2010年的实证研究

股权激励作为一种制度安排,作用在于促进股东和公司管理层形成利益共同体,激励管理层最大限度地为股东和公司创造价值.通过实证研究影响公司价值的相关因素,求证股权激励确实对公司价值有正面影响,同时为上市公司的实施股权激励计划提出若干建议.     

我国上市公司股权激励公告日的时机选择

本文选取了2008年1月1日至2012年12月31日间首次进行股权激励草案公告的245家A股上市公司作为研究对象,运用事件研究法对上市公司公告股权激励草案前后的超额收益情况进行检验.研究发现:即使不考虑股权激励本身带来的短期市场效应,草案公告日也更可能出现在股价低点,说明管理层会对草案公告的时机进行选择.进一步的研究则表明管理层是利用了自身对于公司季度盈余报告的信息优势来进行草案公告日的选择.     

Private equity firm experience and buyout vendor source: What is their impact on efficiency?

Using a dataset comprising 88 Private Equity (PE) backed Leveraged Buyouts (LBOs) completed and exited during the period 1999–2008, this study sheds new light on the impact of buyout vendor source and PE investor experience on post-buyout efficiency during the first 3 years after the transaction. There are three main findings. First, we observe increases in post-buyout efficiency over time, although LBOs from different vendor source differ in terms of post-transaction efficiency levels and improvement trajectories. Private and divisional buyouts are more efficient than the average. Divisional buyouts show higher efficiency improvements than private and secondary buyouts. Secondary buyouts remain below the average. Second, multivariate analyses suggest a positive and significant effect of PE firm experience on post-buyout efficiency. Finally, the observed efficiency patterns seem to be convex, suggesting the major improvements happen in the first 2 years after the transaction.     

股权激励、经理人异质性与控制权私利

文章探讨了不同类型的经理人对股权激励与控制权私利之间关系所起的作用,并以2008~2018年所有A股上市公司数据进行验证,结果发现:独立型经理人对股权激励抑制控制权私利的行为起着正向调节作用,依附型经理人并未发挥有效的监督效应;在内部控制质量较低的环境中,股权激励对控制权私利的抑制效应更显著,发挥的替代效果更佳。本文的研究深化了对经理人公司治理角色的认识,拓宽了对控制权私利的研究。     

公平偏好下考虑互补效应的项目投资收益分配研究

决策者的公平偏好对项目投资合作的形成和推进有重要影响。本文从创业企业和风险投资家的双重道德风险出发,选取Nash谈判解为公平偏好参照点,构建创业企业具有公平偏好的项目投资委托代理模型,研究委托方和代理方的能力存在互补效应的情形下,公平偏好对项目收益分配及双方努力水平的影响。结果表明:项目收益的最优分配比例和双方的最高努力水平均与创业企业的公平偏好程度相关。在互补效应存在时,双方的努力水平不会随收益分配比例的变化呈现单调变化趋势。如果双方的能力互补程度较小,具有公平偏好的创业企业会以Nash谈判解为自己的收益下限,风险投资家需要向其让渡更多的项目收益才能实现有效激励;如果双方的能力互补程度较大,创业企业会将Nash谈判解作为自己的收益上限,风险投资家即使不给予其大于Nash谈判解的收益也可实现有效激励。     

国有企业科研团队的股权分配研究

科研团队是国有企业产品创新和技术创新的主体,对掌握核心技术的科研团队实施股权激励成为企业增强其创新活力的有效手段。通过分析国有企业对科研团队股权激励政策及实践现状,在国有企业科研团队已拥有科技成果但尚未产生经济效益的情况下,以科技成果贡献为导向,采用主成分分析法和权值因子法等设计国有企业科研团队的科技成果贡献考核指标、权重及量表,确定科研团队在企业中可获得的股权分配比例。研究结论为国有企业科研团队实施股权激励提供了理论依据。     

股权融资管制与公司资本结构:模型与模拟

股权融资管制带来的摩擦会如何影响公司的资本结构及资本结构调整？本文建立了股权融资管制摩擦模型,并使用计算机实验模拟的方法,研究股权再融资管制带来的摩擦对公司目标资本结构以及资本结构调整的影响,同时探讨资本结构调整速度模型的适用性。研究发现,外部股权融资管制程度不仅影响公司的目标资本结构,也影响公司资本结构调整的速度,研究结论为观测资本市场融资摩擦提供了一种独特视角。此外,观察分析当前使用的资本结构调整模型,本文发现该模型忽略了变量之间的强约束条件,会导致模型设定偏误。     

Pricing perpetual American catastrophe put options: A penalty function approach

The expected discounted penalty function proposed in the seminal paper by Gerber and Shiu [Gerber, H.U., Shiu, E.S.W., 1998. On the time value of ruin. North Amer. Actuarial J. 2 (1), 48-78] has been widely used to analyze the joint distribution of the time of ruin, the surplus immediately before ruin and the deficit at ruin, and the related quantities in ruin theory. However, few of its applications can be found beyond except that Gerber and Landry [Gerber, H.U., Landry, B., 1998. On the discount penalty at ruin in a jump-diffusion and the perpetual put option. Insurance: Math. Econ. 22, 263-276] explored its use for the pricing of perpetual American put options. In this paper, we further explore the use of the expected discounted penalty function and mathematical tools developed for the function to evaluate perpetual American catastrophe equity put options. We obtain the analytical expression for the price of perpetual American catastrophe equity put options and conduct a numerical implementation for a wide range of parameter values. We show that the use of the expected discounted penalty function enables us to evaluate the perpetual American catastrophe equity put option with minimal numerical work.     

考虑互惠公平的创新顾客激励契约研究

基于公平偏好理论的互惠公平,从创新顾客的互惠偏好程度、激励契约类型与激励效果的关系入手,构建创新顾客参与企业创新活动的激励模型。通过模型求解和分析,探讨激励契约的外部性和互惠关系对于激励效果的影响;此外,进一步分析如何联合经济激励和心理激励,降低企业获得创新顾客高努力投入的成本;最后,通过仿真实验,验证模型分析结果。研究发现:当创新顾客之间出现互惠关系时,最优激励契约取决于创新顾客心理偏好与风险态度之间的相互作用:当创新顾客的风险规避程度较低时,最优激励契约为相对绩效契约;当创新顾客的风险规避程度较高时,最优激励契约为团队报酬契约。     

An equity approach to stream water quality management

A model for stream water quality management with particular emphasis on applicability in Turkey is developed via mathematical programming. A new criterion of equity is introduced and the model is formulated as a quadratic programming problem with two objectives, namely equity among dischargers and minimization of total cost. The model is also applied to a hypothetical stream and compared with other more common water quality management programs.